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Abstract—The widespread adoption of Internet of Things has
led to many security issues. Post the Mirai-based DDoS attack
in 2016 which compromised IoT devices, a host of new malware
using Mirai’s leaked source code and targeting IoT devices have
cropped up, e.g. Satori, Reaper, Amnesia, Masuta etc. These
malware exploit software vulnerabilities to infect IoT devices
instead of open TELNET ports (like Mirai) making them more
difficult to block using existing solutions such as firewalls. In
this research, we present EDIMA, a distributed modular solution
which can be used towards the detection of IoT malware network
activity in large-scale networks (e.g. ISP, enterprise networks)
during the scanning/infecting phase rather than during an attack.
EDIMA employs machine learning algorithms for edge devices’
traffic classification, a packet traffic feature vector database,
a policy module and an optional packet sub-sampling module.
We evaluate the classification performance of EDIMA through
testbed experiments and present the results obtained.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, IoT, Malware, Mirai, Reaper,
Satori, Botnet, Bot Detection, Machine Learning, Anomaly De-
tection
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) [1] is a network of sensing
devices with limited resources and capable of wired/wireless
communications with cloud services. IoT devices are being
increasingly targeted by attackers using malware as they are
easier to infect than conventional computers. This is due to
several reasons [2] such as presence of legacy devices with
no security updates, low priority given to security within the
development cycle, weak login credentials, etc.
In a widely publicized attack, the IoT malware Mirai was
used to propagate the biggest DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-
Service) attack on record on October 21, 2016. The attack
targeted the Dyn DNS (Domain Name Service) servers [3]
and generated an attack throughput of the order of 1.2 Tbps.
It disabled major internet services such as Amazon, Twitter
and Netflix. The attackers had infected IoT devices such as IP
cameras and DVR recorders with Mirai, thereby creating an
army of bots (botnet) to take part in the DDoS attack.
The source code for Mirai was leaked in 2017 and since then
there has been a proliferation of IoT malware. Script “kiddies”
as well as professional blackhat/greyhat hackers have used
the leaked source code to build their own IoT malware.
These malware are usually variants of Mirai using a similar
brute force technique of scanning random IP addresses for
open TELNET ports and attempting to login using a built-in
dictionary of commonly used credentials (Remaiten, Hajime),
or more sophisticated malware that exploit software vulner-
abilities to execute remote command injections on vulnera-
ble devices (Reaper, Satori, Masuta, Linux.Darlloz, Amnesia
etc.). Even though TELNET port scanning can be countered
by deploying firewalls (at the user access gateway) which
block incoming/outgoing TELNET traffic, malware exploiting
software vulnerabilities involving application protocols such
as HTTP, SOAP, PHP etc. are more difficult to block using
firewalls because those application protocols form a part of
legitimate traffic as well.
Bots compromised by Mirai or similar IoT malware can be
used for DDoS attacks, phishing and spamming [4]. These
attacks can cause network downtime for long periods which
may lead to financial loss to network companies, and leak
users’ confidential data. Bitdefender mentioned in its blog in
September 2017 [5] that researchers had estimated at least
100,000 devices infected by Mirai or similar malware revealed
daily through TELNET scanning telemetry data. In an October
2017 article [6], Arbor researchers estimated that the actual
size of the Reaper botnet fluctuated between 10,000-20,000
bots but warned that this number could change at any time
with an additional 2 million devices having been identified
by botnet scanners as potential Reaper bots. A Kaspersky lab
report [7] released in September 2018 says that 121,588 IoT
malware samples were identified in the first half of 2018 which
was three times the number of IoT malware samples in the
whole of 2017.
Further, many of the infected devices are expected to remain
infected for a long time. Therefore, there is a substantial
motivation for detecting these IoT bots and taking appropriate
action against them so that they are unable to cause any further
damage. As pointed out in [8], attempting to ensure that all
IoT devices are secure-by-construction is futile and it is prac-
tically unfeasible to deploy traditional host-based detection
and prevention mechanisms such as antivirus, firewalls for
IoT devices. Therefore, it becomes imperative that the security
mechanisms for the IoT ecosystem are designed to be network-
based rather than host-based.
In this research, we propose a solution towards detecting the
network activity of IoT malware in large-scale networks such
as enterprise and ISP (Internet Service Provider) networks.978-1-5386-4980-0/19/$31.00 c©2019 IEEE
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Our proposed solution consists of machine learning (ML)
algorithms running at the user access gateway which detect
malware activity based on their scanning traffic patterns, a
database that stores the malware scanning traffic patterns
and can be used to retrieve or update those patterns, and
a policy module which decides the further course of action
after gateway traffic has been classified as malicious. It also
includes an optional packet sub-sampling module which can be
deployed for example, in case of enterprises where a number
of IoT devices (≈ 10-100) are connected to a single access
gateway. The bot detection solution can be deployed both on
physical access gateways supplied by the ISP companies or
as NFV (Network Function Virtualization) functions at the
customer premises/enterprise in a SDN-NFV based network
architecture, where SDN stands for Software-Defined Net-
working.
Bots scanning for and infecting vulnerable devices are
targeted in particular by our solution. This is because the scan-
ning and propagation phase of the botnet life-cycle stretches
over many months and we can detect and isolate the bots
before they can participate in an actual attack such as DDoS.
If the DDoS attack has already occurred (due to a botnet),
detecting the attack itself is not that difficult and there are
already existing methods both in literature and industry to
defend against such attacks. Once the IoT bots are detected,
the network operators can take suitable countermeasures such
as blocking the traffic originating from IoT bots and notifying
the local network administrators. The major contributions of
this paper are listed below:
1) We have categorized most of the current IoT malware
into a few categories to help identify similar malware
and simplify the task of designing detection methods for
them.
2) We have analyzed the traffic patterns for IoT malware
from each category through testbed experiments and
packet capture utilities.
3) We have proposed a modular solution towards detection
of IoT malware activity by using ML techniques with the
above traffic patterns.
II. RELATED WORK
There are several works in the literature on detecting
PC-based botnets using their CnC (Command-and-control)
server communication features. Bothunter [9] builds a bot
infection dialog model based on which three bot-specific
sensors are constructed and correlation is performed between
inbound intrusion/scan alarms and the infection dialog model
to generate a consolidated report. Spatio-temporal similarities
between bots in a botnet in terms of bot-CnC coordinated
activities are captured from network traffic and leveraged
towards botnet detection in a local area network in Botsniffer
[10]. In BotMiner [11], the authors have proposed a botnet
detection system which clusters similar CnC communication
traffic and similar malicious activity traffic, and uses cross
cluster correlation to detect bots in a monitored network.
There has also been some research on intrusion detection
and anomaly detection systems for IoT. A whitelist-based
intrusion detection system for IoT devices (Heimdall) has been
presented in [12]. The authors in [13] propose an intrusion
detection model for IoT backbone networks leveraging two-
layer dimension reduction and two-tier classification tech-
niques to detect U2R (User-to-Root) and R2L (Remote-to-
Local) attacks.
Of late, there has been an interest in IoT botnet and attack
detection in the research community resulting in a number of
papers addressing these problems. In [14], deep-autoencoders
based anomaly detection has been used to detect attacks
launched from IoT botnets. A few works have focused on
building normal communication profiles for IoT devices which
are not expected to deviate much over a long period of time.
DEFT [15] has used ML algorithms at SDN controllers and
access gateways to build normal device traffic fingerprints
while [16] proposes a tool to automatically generate MUD
(Manufacturer Usage Description) profiles for a number of
consumer IoT devices. In DIoT [17], the authors have pro-
posed a method to classify typically used IoT devices into
various device types and build their normal traffic profiles so
that a deviation from those profiles is flagged as anomalous
traffic.
Our work addresses a few important gaps in the literature
when it comes to distinguishing between legitimate and botnet
IoT traffic. First, the works on detecting botnets using their
CnC communication features [9]–[11], [18] are designed for
PC-based botnets rather than IoT botnets which are the focus
of our work. Second, we do not aim to detect botnets (networks
of bots) but instead, network activity generated by individual
bots. IoT botnets tend to consist of hundreds of thousands to
millions of devices spread over vast geographies, hence, it is
impractical to detect a whole network of IoT bots. Therefore,
we do not require computationally expensive clustering algo-
rithms as used in [10], [11].
Third, unlike [14], [17], we aim to detect IoT malware
activity much before the actual attack, during the scanning/in-
fection phase. Finally, instead of fingerprinting the normal
traffic of IoT devices [15], [17] and using those fingerprints
towards anomaly detection, we detect the malware-induced
scanning packet traffic generated by infected IoT devices. This
is because the former approach suffers from limitations such
as possibility of misclassification of an infected device as a
legitimate device type, testing against only simple malware
e.g. Mirai which may result in failure to detect other, more
sophisticated malware, etc. The latter approach is not free
from limitations as well, since it is not resilient against new
undiscovered malware whose scanning traffic features have
not been updated in the database. We advocate for a combined
approach consisting of both IoT device fingerprinting/anomaly
detection and IoT malware scanning traffic detection.
III. EDIMA ARCHITECTURE
Our proposed solution towards detecting the scanning
packet traffic generated by IoT malware through the use of ML
algorithms is called EDIMA (Early Detection of IoT Malware
Network Activity) and is shown in Fig.1. It is designed to have
a modular architecture with of five different modules:
1) ML Classifier: The ML classifier runs on the access
gateway connected to IoT devices at customer premises
or enterprise. It collects the incoming traffic samples,
extracts the feature vectors for those samples and clas-
sifies them based on the ML model trained by ML model
constructor. More details about the ML classifier are
given in Section IV-B.
2) ML Model Constructor: The ML model for classifying
access gateway traffic is trained by ML model constructor
using the feature vectors and class labels retrieved from
Packet traffic feature database as inputs to a supervised
classification algorithm such as Naive Bayes (NB), De-
cision Trees (DT), Support Vector Machines (SVM) etc.
The model is then sent to the ML classifier. Whenever
a new malware is discovered, the ML model has to be
re-trained and compared with the existing ML model
for classification performance. If there is no significant
improvement in performance, the existing ML model
continues to be used, otherwise the re-trained ML model
is updated to the ML classifier module.
3) Packet Traffic Feature Database: The database stores
a list of feature vectors extracted from traffic samples
collected from access gateways connected to IoT devices
infected with known IoT malware as well as gateways
connected to uninfected devices. The database is updated
frequently for newly discovered malware. The feature
vectors and corrresponding class labels are retrieved by
the ML model constructor for training ML classifier
for the first time and also for re-training the classifier
whenever a new malware is discovered. We envisage a
community of security researchers, industry personnel
and users who will collect traffic data for IoT malware
through honeypots, consumer access gateways etc. The
feature vectors extracted from the raw traffic data samples
and the class labels assigned to those samples will be
updated to the online feature database.
4) Policy Module: The policy module consists of a list of
policies defined by network administrator which decide
the course of actions to be taken once the traffic from an
access gateway has been classified as malicious by the
ML classifier module. For instance, the network admin-
istrator can block the entire traffic originating from bots
and bring them back online only after it is confirmed that
the malware has been removed from those IoT devices.
5) Sub-sampling Module (optional): For premises having
thousands of IoT devices such as enterprises, industries
etc. we also propose an optional sub-sampling module
as introduced in [19]. This module samples the packet
traffic from IoT devices both along time as well across
the devices and presents them as input to the ML classifier
module. The sub-sampling module would help reduce
the computational overhead for ML classifier module by
forwarding only a fraction of the incoming IoT packet
traffic.
Fig. 1: EDIMA Architecture
IV. EXTRACTION OF IOT MALWARE TRAFFIC FEATURES
A. Malware Categorization
We have categorized known IoT malware into three cate-
gories based on type of vulnerability that they target: TELNET,
HTTP POST and HTTP GET. TELNET is an application-layer
protocol used for bidirectional byte-oriented communication.
Typically, a user with a terminal and running a TELNET client
program, accesses a remote host running a TELNET server by
requesting a connection to the remote host and logging in by
providing its credentials. HTTP GET and POST are methods
based on HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol) application-
layer protocol which are used to request data from and send
data to server resources respectively. For example, HTTP GET
is commonly used for requesting web pages from remote web
servers through a browser. We have presented the malware
categories, various malware belonging to those categories and
brief descriptions of their operation in Table I.
B. ML Classification
The classification is performed on IoT access gateway-
level traffic rather than device-level traffic as working on
aggregate traffic is faster and reduces the memory space re-
quired. We define two classes of gateway-level traffic : benign
and malicious. Benign traffic refers to the gateway traffic
with no malware-induced scanning packets while malicious
traffic refers to gateway traffic that includes malware-induced
scanning packets from one of the three malware categories.
For classification of gateway traffic, we have to first generate
training data samples consisting of packet captures belonging
to those classes. Benign traffic is not difficult to generate
since it involves the normal operation of uninfected devices.
However, malicious traffic would contain both benign traffic as
well as scanning/infection packets generated by malware. To
keep things simple, we chose to collect the gateway traffic
statically in fixed session intervals. Further, we apply the
classification algorithm on these traffic sessions rather than
individual packets because per-packet classification is compu-
tationally much more costly and doesn’t yield any significant
benefits. The
Category Malware Description
TELNET
Mirai Sends SYN packets to probe open
TELNET ports at random IP ad-
dresses. If successful, it tries to lo-
gin using list of default credentials
[20].
Hajime Same propagation mechanism as
Mirai, but no CnC server. Instead,
it is built on a P2P network. Pur-
pose seems to be to improve secu-
rity of IoT devices [21].
Remaiten Same propagation mechanism as
Mirai. Downloads binary specific
to targeted platform. Uses IRC pro-
tocol for CnC server communica-
tion [22].
Linux.Wifatch Same propagation mechanism as
Mirai. Apparently, it tries to secure
IoT devices from other malware
[23].
Brickerbot Rewrites the device firmware, ren-
dering the device permanently in-
operable [24].
HTTP POST
Satori Sends NewInternalClient request
through miniigd SOAP service
(REALTEK SDK) or sends ma-
licious packets to port 37215
(Huwaei home gateway) [25].
Masuta Forms SOAP request which by-
passes authentication and causes
arbitrary code execution [26].
Linux.Darlloz Sends HTTP POST requests by
using PHP ’php-cgi’ Information
Disclosure Vulnerability to down-
load the worm from a malicious
server on an unpatched device [27].
Reaper Scans first on a list of TCP Ports
to fingerprint devices, then sec-
ond wave of scans on TCP ports
running web services such as 80,
8080. . . , sends HTTP POST re-
quest for command injection [28].
HTTP GET Reaper Scanning behavior similar asabove, sends HTTP request for
remote command execution,
usually through CGI or PHP.
Amnesia Makes simple HTTP requests,
searches for a special string “Cross
Web Server” in the HTTP response
from target. If successful, sends
four more HTTP requests which
contain exploit payloads of four
different shell commands [29].
TABLE I: IoT Malware Categories
The steps for gateway-level traffic classification are given
below:
1) Filter each traffic session to include only TCP packets
with SYN flag activated and destination port numbers
belonging to a target list.
2) Extract the feature vectors for each traffic session.
3) Retrieve the trained classifier from ML model constructor
and apply it on the extracted feature vectors to classify
the corresponding sessions.
The target list of destination port numbers is made on the
basis of information obtained from public malware exploits.
For example, in ’TELNET’ category, target destination port
numbers are 23 and 2323. In ’HTTP POST’ category, target
destination port numbers are 37215, 80, 20736, 36895 etc.
In ’HTTP GET’ category, target destination port number is
always 80.
In this work, we use a total of 4 features for ML model
training and traffic classification:
1) Number of unique destination IP addresses
2) Number of packets per destination IP address (maximum,
minimum, mean)
The motivation behind selecting the first feature is that the
malware generate random IP addresses and send malicious
requests to them. Hence, the number of unique destination IP
addresses in case of malware-induced scannning traffic will
be far more than benign traffic. The second feature set seeks
to exploit the fact that malware typically do not send multiple
malicious packets to the same IP address (only a single packet
is sent in most cases), possibly to cover as many devices as
possible during the scanning/propagation phase.
One may argue that the malware author/attacker can adopt
a less aggressive scanning strategy to avoid detection. The
attacker will incur a cost though, in terms of the malware
performance, resulting in fewer infected devices in a fixed
time period. We plan to investigate this malware performance-
scanning behavior trade off by formulating an optimization
problem in the future. For now, the duration of traffic sessions
collected for training/classification can be increased to counter
any decrease in scanning rates by the attacker.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Testbed Description
We built a testbed with IoT devices, a laptop PC, An-
droid smartphone and a wireless access gateway to collect
ingress/egress traffic at the gateway which would form a part
of the training data used to train the ML algorithms to be
deployed in the ML Classifier module. The IoT devices were:
Philips Hue bridge, D-Link DCS-930L Wi-Fi IP camera and
TP-Link HS110 Smart Wi-Fi Plug. The laptop PC has an Intel
Core i3-5020U 2.2 GHz processor with 4GB RAM and runs
Windows 10 OS. Network applications such as web browser
(accessing web pages, video streaming sites e.g. YouTube),
email client, WiFi camera online platform etc. were run on the
the laptop PC by a user. The Android smartphone has Cortex-
A53 Octa-core 1.6 GHz processor with 3GB RAM and runs
Android 8.0 OS. Again, the same user ran applications such as
web browser, social media (Facebook/Twitter/LinkedIn), chat
(WhatsApp), Wi-Fi plug app, Hue app etc. on the smartphone
which also ran a few other network applications in the back-
ground. The wireless access gateway was a D-Link DIR-600
router with an Atheros AR7240 350 MHz network processor,
Atheros AR9285 network adapter, 32MB RAM, 4MB flash
supporting 1EEE 802.11b/g/n Wi-Fi standards. The testbed
is shown in Fig. 2. We used a TP-Link TL-SG108E Gigabit
Ethernet switch with port-mirroring feature to mirror the traffic
from all of the above devices (IoT, laptop, smartphone) to a
Raspberry Pi 3B+ Ethernet port and monitor the cumulative
traffic.
Fig. 2: Testbed used to collect packet traffic for ML training
B. Evaluation Methodology
As we can’t use real malware due to legal and ethical
considerations, we wrote scripts to simulate the generation of
malicious packets based on publicly available exploits [30]
for the vulnerabilities exploited by those malware. The script
generates random IP addresses and sends malicious requests
to them in order to execute remote command injection attacks.
The injected commands were non-malicious (for ex. ls -l,
uname -a), thus causing no actual harm to any device in the
network even if it was vulnerable. The scanning/infection rates
in our scripts were designed keeping in the mind the scan-
ning/infection behavior reported online and the Mirai source
code which is the basis for most of the current IoT malware.
We selected one malware per category for our performance
evaluation since the malware in each category have similar
scanning/infection behavior.
A total of 60 traffic sessions of 15 minutes duration each
were collected for both benign and malicious classes through
our testbed. The traffic sessions collected for each case were
divided into two sets: training and test data using a 70:30 split.
For the training data, the class labels were assigned to each
feature vector extracted from the traffic sessions included in
the training data.
C. Results
The distributions of the feature values for benign and ma-
licious training data where the malware belongs to TELNET,
HTTP POST and HTTP GET categories are shown in Fig. 3
using box plots. The distribution plots for feature F1 under
benign and malicious conditions where the malware belongs
to TELNET category, are quite visibly distinct, though for
the other features Feature2, Feature3, Feature4, the plots are
not that easily distinguishable. Similarly, the distributions of
HTTP POST and GET packet traffic features under benign
and malicious conditions are not completely distinguishable.
If there is a significant difference in the distribution of a
feature under benign and malicious conditions, that difference
can be leveraged by the trained ML model to distinguish
between benign and malicious traffic with reasonable detection
accuracy. However, if the feature distributions under the two
(a) Benign traffic training data
(b) Malicious TELNET traffic train-
ing data
(c) Benign traffic training data
(d) Malicious POST traffic training
data
(e) Benign traffic training data
(f) Malicious GET traffic training
data
Fig. 3: Distribution of feature vector values
Classifier Accuracy Precision Recall F1 Score
Random Forest 88.8% 0.86 1 0.92
k-NN 94.44% 0.92 1 0.96
Gaussian Naive Bayes 77.78% 0.75 1 0.86
TABLE II: Accuracy, Precision, Recall and F1 scores for various classifiers
conditions are not easily distinguishable, it may impair the
detection performance.
The scikit-learn ML algorithms library [31] was used for
training and classification purposes. We trained Gaussian
Naive Bayes, k-NN (k-Nearest Neighbor) and Random Forest
algorithms with our training data and evaluated the trained
ML models with test data for all three malware categories.
The classification accuracy, precision, recall and F-1 scores
obtained for the above three classification algorithms are
shown in Table II.
The classification accuracy refers to the fraction of the total
number of input samples whose labels are correctly predicted
by a classifier. The precision is the ratio T PT P+FP , where T P
is the number of true positives and FP is the number of
false positives. It represents the ability of a classifier to avoid
labeling samples that are negative as positive. The recall is
the ratio T PT P+FN , where T P is the number of true positives
and FN is the number of false negatives. It represents the
ability of a classifier to avoid labeling samples that are positive
as negative. The F1 score is the harmonic mean of precision
and recall, expressed as 2× precision×recallprecision+recall . It represents balance
between precision and recall offered by a classifier. The scores
in Table II show that the k-NN classifier performs the best
followed by Random Forest classifier and Gaussian Naive
Bayes classifier.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed EDIMA, a modular solution
for early detection of network activity originating from IoT
malware using ML classification techniques. Existing IoT
malware were distributed among multiple categories based
on their targeted software vulnerabilities. Later, steps for the
ML classifier operation and the features used for classification
were listed. A testbed consisting of PC, smartphone and IoT
devices connected to an access gateway was used to evalu-
ate the classification performance of EDIMA. Using packet
traffic captures at access gateway-level, feature vectors were
extracted with class labels (benign or malicious) assigned to
them. Subsequently, we depicted the distribution of benign
and malicious traffic feature vectors for different malware
categories. A proportion of the feature vectors extracted were
used as training data to train few standard ML algorithms
and the ML models thus obtained were applied to test data
with their classification scores reported. As part of our future
work, we are working on the software-based implementation
of EDIMA and its performance evaluation. We are also plan-
ning to adapt some state-of-the-art botnet detection techniques
using bot-CnC communication features and ML algorithms
for malware activity detection and compare their performance
with EDIMA.
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